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 Formula Approaches for 
Market Access Negotiations 
 
Abstract:  Most of the large tariff reductions achieved in multilateral trade 
negotiations have involved tariff-cutting formulas such as the “Swiss” 
formula.  However, wide variations in initial tariff rates between active 
participants call for new approaches under the Doha Development Agenda. 
This paper surveys a range of formula options and examines both targeted 
and flexible applications of the Swiss formula that target tariff escalation and 
peaks, and would allow policy makers to directly target how far they will 
move towards free trade, while providing some flexibility for trading off 
reductions in peak tariffs against reductions in lower-tariff sectors.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
There is an urgent need for WTO members to identify a set of feasible and effective 
modalities for establishing market access commitments in current WTO negotiations. 
Otherwise, there is a very real danger that the Doha Development Agenda  
negotiations will fail to make progress in expanding market access, particularly for 
developing countries.  We stress two widely-agreed objectives for such modalities:  
(i) they should ensure a balanced exchange of concessions, and (ii) they should reduce 
relatively high barriers by more than lower barriers—both to increase the size of the 
market access concessions exchanged, and to increase the economic benefits to 
importing countries. While the trade agenda has expanded considerably beyond the 
GATT focus on tariff reductions, there is widespread agreement that improvements in 
market access conditions remain one of the most important ways that WTO 
negotiations can contribute to economic development (Hoekman 2002). 
 
One approach frequently adopted in past trade negotiations is the development of a 
formula to determine the commitments made by each country. If the right formula can 
be found, this approach increases the likelihood of success relative to options 
involving more discretion in determining protection in individual sectors. This greater 
probability of success reflects the immediate creation of a balanced package involving 
gains to exporters as well as costs to import-substituting firms, and a reduction in the 
ability of individual firms and sectors to lobby for the retention of protection that 
benefits them at the expense of the broader social interest. Greater success of formula-
based approaches has been evident not just at the WTO, but in regional arrangements 
such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (Fukase and Martin 2001), which began with an 
unsuccessful discretionary approach and succeeded using a formula approach that 
encouraged offers of market access. Nor are formula approaches relevant only for 
trade in goods. Low and Mattoo (2003) have advocated applying formula-based 
approaches in the Doha Agenda negotiations on Services.  
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The initial approach to tariff negotiations at GATT was the request-and-offer 
procedure under which members negotiate bilateral market access concessions, and 
subsequently extend them to all members. Using this procedure, GATT members 
were able to reduce average tariffs by around 20 percent in the initial, Geneva Round 
(1947) of negotiations (Baldwin 1987). However, emphasis on this approach 
produced disappointingly slow progress in the four following rounds of negotiations1. 
Only with the introduction of a comprehensive formula approach during the Kennedy 
Round (1963-7) was it again possible to achieve substantial cuts in protection—35 
percent as against an average of 2.5 percent in the previous four negotiations. The 
next round, the Tokyo Round (1974-9), used a more sophisticated formula, the so-
called Swiss formula, and achieved a 30 percent reduction in average tariffs.   The 
Uruguay Round (1986-94) used a simpler approach involving setting broad tariff-
reduction goals such as a 30 percent average reduction on industrial products, but 
leaving the distribution of the cut across sectors up to negotiations between trading 
partners. This approach was successful in achieving substantial tariff reductions. 
However, it was generally not successful in achieving higher proportional cuts in 
higher tariff rates and hence in sharply reducing tariff escalation. Abreu (1996, p64) 
observes that items with higher tariff rates typically had smaller proportional cuts.   
 
The Uruguay Round agreement on agriculture involved a range of formula-type 
elements, including average cuts in tariffs; a minimum cut in each tariff line; formulas 
for establishing bindings where protection had been provided by non-tariff barriers; 
and ceiling binding options. The resulting outcome frequently involved large tariff 
cuts in small tariffs (Hathaway and Ingco 1996), and extremely high tariff bindings 
that are creating difficulties for Doha Development  Agenda negotiators. It highlights 
the dangers of approaches that focus on the average cut in tariffs, rather than 
achieving cuts in the average tariff, and the risks associated with leaving excessive 
discretion in the approaches used to reduce protection. 
 
Part of the reduction in Uruguay Round tariffs was brought about through zero-for-
zero tariff reductions in which tariffs on groups of products were reduced to zero—an 
approach that succeeded in the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), but failed 
in the ITA (II) and the abortive proposals for Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization. 
As Panagariya (2002) notes, it seems likely that the sectors targeted under this 
approach will generally be those where tariff rates are initially low, and those of 
particular interest to the major industrial powers, rather than high protection rates and 
those of greatest concern to poorer developing countries.  
 
The potential benefits from use of a formula approach are large. If a suitable tops-
down formula can be identified and implemented, we can be relatively sure that it will 
lead to a global welfare gain, since the social costs of tariffs generally rise more 
rapidly than the rates themselves2 By contrast, approaches that focus on reducing 
relatively low, “nuisance”, tariffs face the risk of reducing economic welfare and tariff 
revenues by diverting imports away from higher-tariff items (see Martin 1997). Even 
request-and-offer procedures can result in a focus on reducing tariffs in relatively 
lightly-protected, “easy” sectors, rather than the sectors with the high protection rates 
that generate the greatest social costs. 
                                                 
1 A simple formula was first tried out in the Dillon Round (Ernest Preeg, personal communication). 
2 See Vousden 1990, p233. López and Panagariya (1992) point out that the presence of non-produced 
intermediates weakens this general proposition.    
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Formula approaches also have the potential to contribute to a more balanced package 
of concessions between developed and developing countries. They would likely 
require reductions in the relatively high tariffs faced by smaller and poorer countries 
(Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga 2002), who find it difficult to make progress in request-
and-offer negotiations because of the small size of their markets. They are also likely 
to reduce protection in the more highly protected sectors in developing countries, 
increasing efficiency in these countries, and disproportionately improving the market 
access opportunities of developing countries by stimulating south-south trade (Hertel 
and Martin 2001).  
 
The challenge for participants in identifying the best approach to use is complicated 
by the sharp differences between the current situation and the beginning point in 
earlier rounds of negotiations. One important difference is the much wider dispersion 
in the initial tariff regimes of active WTO participants. A second is the frequently-
wide gaps between applied rates and tariff bindings resulting from the use of high 
bindings in the Uruguay Round, and from the wave of applied rate reductions that has 
swept the developing countries in recent years, reducing average tariff rates to a 
fraction of their level in the 1980s (World Bank 2001). Another important difference 
is the larger number of active participants in the negotiations, which makes classic 
request-and-offer procedures more difficult. When formula approaches were applied 
in the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds, the number of participants was relatively small 
and the negotiations—which focused on tariffs on industrial products in developed 
countries—involved tariff regimes that were broadly similar in their average levels 
and distribution. By the time a sharply tops-down formula was applied in the Tokyo 
Round, the active participants (industrial countries) had been through six previous 
rounds of negotiations on the same products. By contrast, the current negotiations are 
only the second for agriculture, and the second involving active participation by large 
numbers of developing countries in exchanges of market access concessions for 
industrial products (Martin and Winters 1996).  
 
The increase in the number of active participants in the negotiations increases the 
difficulties involved in request-and-offer type procedures, and increases the attraction 
of formula approaches. However, the wider dispersion of initial tariffs, and the gaps 
between bindings and applied rates, may create challenges and a need for flexibility in 
formula approaches not encountered in the Tokyo Round. A key purpose of this paper 
is to try to identify potential solutions that negotiators might use to deal with these 
problems. 
 
Strict application of a tops-down formula would undoubtedly create political 
resistance in virtually all countries, but would produce correspondingly large benefits 
in terms of market access, which might generate the political support needed to 
complete the negotiations.  One of the interesting features of the wave of across-the-
board liberalization undertaken in developing countries, and in liberalizing industrial 
countries like Australia and New Zealand, during recent years has been the much 
more muted political opposition to broad-based liberalization than to sector-by-sector 
approaches. Partly, this reflects the fact that, with general liberalization, the costs of 
each industry are lowered at the same time as their own output protection is lowered. 
We would speculate that another part is due to the special pleading of a wide range of 
sectors being less effective when a broad reform to improve the competitiveness of 
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the economy is being undertaken, than when specific sectors are being singled out for 
reductions in protection—or are actively seeking protection.   
 
This paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we first provide some detail on the 
current market access landscape.  This highlights important issues related to tariff 
peaks, unbound tariffs, and gaps between bound and applied rates.  Collectively, these 
issues will be important determinants of success for any approach to defining market 
access concessions.  In Section 3, we then consider some formula-based approaches. 
In Section 4, we develop the concept of “flexible formula” approaches.  These 
approaches potentially include built-in elements of credit for autonomous 
liberalization, and target tariff escalation and peaks, yet also allows some flexibility 
for trading off reduction in peak tariffs (reflecting politically sensitive sectors) against 
reductions in low-tariff sectors. In Section 5, we consider some of the design issues 
associated with the use of a flexible formula approach.  For illustration, and to assess 
the quantitative implications of some plausible approaches, we work with an initial 
sample of 3 industrial countries and 3 developing countries in Section 6.  We 
conclude in Section 7. 
 
2. A QUICK TOUR OF THE MARKET ACCESS LANDSCAPE 
 
Tariff negotiations in the multilateral trading system have generally been based on 
tariff bindings, or schedules of concessions tabled under GATT rules, and the 
coverage and level of these bindings is an important element of the initial conditions 
for the negotiations.  Table 1 provides information on the share of industrial-product 
tariffs (on a trade-weighted basis) that remains either unbound or bound above applied 
rates. While tariffs in the OECD (and Latin America) are generally bound, many 
Asian and African economy tariffs remain unbound despite more than a four-fold 
increase in the coverage of developing-country tariff bindings in the Uruguay Round 
(Abreu 1996). For almost all developing countries, existing bindings are, on average, 
well above applied rates, reflecting a combination of relatively high initial bindings, 
and the subsequent wave of reductions in applied rates.  (See Blackhurst et al 1996, 
Francois 2001). 
 
In addition to general Uruguay Round commitments, there have also been efforts for 
sector-based commitments to implement zero tariffs (called “zero-for-zero”).  This is 
reflected in the next-to-last column of Table 1. As a result of zero-for-zero efforts, 
OECD economies have between roughly 10% and 30% of tariff lines bound at zero 
percent.  Most developing countries have opted out of this process.  Zero-for-zero 
increased developed country duty-free imports to 43% of total imports (Laird 1998). 
The process itself ground to a halt after the initial Information Technology Agreement 
(ITA).  This seems to have been for two reasons: (i) the sectors in which OECD 
economies could easily reach agreement had already been included, and (ii) those 
sectors remaining involve North-South issues not susceptible to this approach.  In 
other words, the cherries have been picked, leaving us with the hard nuts.  
 
With the implementation of Uruguay Round commitments, average ad valorem tariffs 
in the industrial countries generally are around 3 percent.  This is reflected in the first 
columns of Table 2.  However, there are important exceptions.  One of these is 
textiles and clothing, where the average rate is roughly three times this average .  This 
is reflected in the standard deviation and maximum tariff columns.  With full 
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implementation of current commitments, we estimate a simple average industrial 
tariff in the United States of 3.2 percent, a standard deviation of 4.3, and a maximum 
tariff of 37.5 percent.  The European Union has a higher average, but less dispersion.  
We estimate an EU average of 3.7 percent, a standard deviation of 3.6 percent, and a 
maximum tariff of 17 percent. 
 
For the developing countries in Table 1, average industrial tariffs range from a low of 
3 to 4 percent to a high of more than 20 percent.  Table 2 presents detailed data for 
three developing countries:  Brazil, India, and Thailand.  These countries span the 
spectrum of developing country bindings as reflected in Table 1.  Brazil’s tariffs are 
all bound, though the average rate for industrial products is 14.9 percentage points 
above the current applied rate.  We refer to this gap below as “binding overhang.”  
India and Thailand’s tariffs are partially covered by bindings, again with significant 
binding overhang.   
 
As in the case of industrial tariffs, the stage for any future agriculture negotiations 
was largely set by the Uruguay Round outcome-- this time by the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture (URAA).  One key difference from industrial products is 
that essentially all agricultural tariffs are bound. However, in both industrial and 
developing countries, there is a large degree of binding overhang resulting from “dirty 
tariffication” or the use of “ceiling bindings” (Hathaway and Ingco 1996). The next 
round of agricultural negotiations was scheduled in the URAA, while the negotiating 
parameters (tariffs, tariff-rate-quota levels, subsidy commitments, etc.) must also be 
viewed in the context of the schedules of URAA commitments.  The system that has 
emerged is complex and similar to arrangements in the textile and clothing sectors, 
featuring a mix of bilaterally allocated tariff-rate-quotas (with associated quota rents) 
and tariffs. Viewed in conjunction with industrial protection, the basic pattern is that 
the industrial countries protect agriculture and processed food, while protection in 
developing countries is more balanced (though also higher overall) in its focus on 
food and non-food manufactured goods.  Any formula approach to negotiating market 
access in agriculture will have to deal with both tariff bindings and quantity 
commitments. 
 
3. A PRIMER ON TARIFF REDUCTION FORMULAS 
 
A range of different tariff-cutting formulas has been considered or implemented under 
GATT and regional trade arrangements.  Stern (1976), Laird (1998), Laird and Yeats 
(1987) and Panagariya (2002) all discuss a number of potential approaches. The first 
is a simple proportional cut: 
 
t1 = c ⋅ t0  (1) 
 
Where t0  is the initial tariff (which may be an MFN applied rate; a preferential rate in 
a regional negotiation; or a tariff binding in the WTO context), t1 the rate after 
application of the formula and c is the constant proportion of their original rate to 
which tariffs are to be reduced.  
 
After years of intense diplomatic negotiations on the difficult technical subject of 
situations where there were disparities in countries’ initial tariff rates (Preeg 1970), a 
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50 percent proportional cut formula was used in the Kennedy Round (1963-67). Some 
products were, in fact, exempted from this approach and permitted smaller tariff 
reductions on the grounds of their sensitivity. Since the products exempted had much 
higher than average tariffs, these exemptions substantially reduced the cut in the 
overall average tariff. Baldwin (1987, p43) estimates that, despite these exceptions, 
the reduction in average tariffs on industrial products was 35 percent. This compared 
extremely favorably with the average of 2.5 percent he estimated was achieved in the 
second through the fifth rounds of GATT tariff negotiations, generally conducted 
under the request-and-offer approach.  
 
While equation (1) brings about a large reduction in the absolute value of higher 
tariffs, it does not have the desirable feature of bringing about larger proportional 
reductions in the highest tariffs.   The ratio of the post-round tariff to the pre-round 
tariff is, in fact, equal for all tariff rates. This is shown by the fact that, for all tariff 
rates: 
 
t1
t0
= c  (2) 
 
Equally important, a proportional approach means market access concessions are 
higher for highly protected products than for less-protected products. As we show in 
the Appendix, the proportional reduction in domestic market prices increases with the 
initial tariff rate, implying that increases in market access will tend to be greater on 
products with higher initial tariffs.  
 
An alternative proposal considered in the Tokyo Round negotiations was a more 
general linear reduction approach: 
 
t1 = d + f ⋅ t0 (3) 
 
where d is a positive constant and f is a number between zero and one. As with 
equation (1), this formula may be written with tariffs in percentage or proportional 
terms by making an appropriate adjustment to the parameter d. This approach would 
generally lead to larger percentage reductions in higher tariff rates, as is shown in the 
Appendix.  As is also shown in the Appendix, the reduction in domestic prices under 
this general linear reduction approach will again generally rise with the initial tariff 
rate.  
 
Formula (3) suffers, however, from a potentially serious problem where initial tariff 
rates are low. If the parameter d exceeds zero—which it must to yield larger 
percentage reductions in higher rates—this formula will lead to increases in lower 
rates. While there may be a case for some such increases in tariffs as a way of 
reducing the variation in tariff rates and hence the cost of protection (Anderson 1999), 
such increases in tariffs do not sit easily with the trade liberalizing raison d’etre of the 
WTO.  As a means of dealing with this problem, the proponents of this approach 
during the Tokyo Round advocated that it be applied only for tariffs greater than 5 
percent (Laird and Yeats 1987).  
 
Like the simple proportional cut, the general linear approach yields greater market 
access concessions for products with high tariffs than for products with low ones.  A 
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third potential formula considered in the Tokyo Round involved taking the square of 
the tariff rate from the initial tariff rate. To obtain sufficient tariff reductions, it was 
proposed that this operation be undertaken four times. 
 
The fourth candidate formula--and the one finally accepted in the Tokyo Round after 
a great deal of negotiation-- was the Swiss formula: 
 
0
0
1 ta
tat +
⋅=  (4) 
 
where a is a positive tariff rate that becomes a ceiling on tariff rates. If tariffs are 
expressed in proportional terms, then the Tokyo Round value of this parameter was in 
the range 0.14 to 0.16. For tariffs in percentage terms, the corresponding parameter 
values are 14 to 16.  
 
The Swiss formula has a number of desirable features for tariff negotiations. It is 
simple, with a single application of the formula being sufficient to bring about the 
required transformation of tariff rates. It is particularly effective in reducing peak 
tariffs, since even the very highest tariffs are reduced below the value a. Finally, it has 
the desirable feature of reducing higher tariff rates by more, in both absolute and 
relative terms, than lower tariff rates. This feature is important both for overall 
economic efficiency, and for preserving tariff revenues for any given reduction in the 
average tariff. 
 
The progressive nature of the reductions under the Swiss formula can be shown by the 
ratio of the new to the old tariff, which we show in the Appendix falls as t0  increases.: 
Also as shown in the Appendix, the reduction in domestic prices with the Swiss 
formula is higher for higher tariff rates, and the rate of reduction increases with the 
initial tariff rate.   Hence, increases in market access are greatest for the most heavily 
protected products.  
A few examples are useful for obtaining a feel for the nature of the relationship 
between initial and final tariffs under the Swiss formula. For an extremely small 
initial tariff, say one tenth of one percent, a/(a+t0) in equation (8) is essentially one, 
implying no reduction in the tariff. For an initial tariff rate of a, the final tariff rates is 
a half of a, implying a 50 percent reduction from the initial tariff.  For a very high 
initial tariff, t0/(a+t0) is effectively one and the tariff rate is essentially reduced to a.  
A very stylized comparison of the proportional tariff cut of 0.5 used in the Kennedy 
Round with a Swiss Formula using the parameter 0.16 from the Tokyo Round is 
shown in Figure 1. The diagram shows that the cuts in low tariffs are smaller using 
the Swiss formula than using the proportional cut formula, but that the cuts for tariffs 
above 0.16 were larger using the Swiss formula. While the figure does not make this 
clear, no tariff would remain above 0.16 following application of this formula.  
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Figure 1. Impacts of a Proportional and a Swiss Formula for Tariff Cutting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A number of other formula-type approaches to structuring market access expansion 
have been proposed. Josling and Rae (forthcoming) consider alternatives including 
reduction of bound rates to applied rates; the introduction of ceilings on tariffs; and 
the use of “cocktail” approaches involving use of different formulas, such as 
reductions to a ceiling rate, proportional cuts and Swiss-formula cuts over different 
ranges of tariffs. Hoekman and Olarreaga (2002) examine the introduction of a limit 
on the ratio of the highest tariffs to the average as a means of dealing with tariff 
peaks.  
 
 
4. INTRODUCING SOME FLEXIBILITY TO FORMULA CUTS 
 
There are good reasons to question whether a pure Swiss formula, with a common 
upper limit of around 0.15 as used in the Tokyo Round, would provide sufficiently 
flexibility for all WTO members to reach agreement on tariff reductions under the 
Doha Development Agenda. A key difference from the Tokyo Round is the wide 
variation in tariffs between active participants in the negotiations. In fact, it seems 
very possible that the Swiss formula was not sufficiently flexible in the past either.  
Even though the participants in the Tokyo had been through six previous rounds of 
negotiations on the same products, large numbers of products with relatively high 
tariffs were excluded from the formula in the Tokyo Round and treated instead on a 
case-by-case basis. Unfortunately, many of these products were items such as 
agricultural products, textiles and clothing that are of particular interest to developing 
countries, which were not active participants in the exchange of market access 
t1 
t0 0 0.16 0.32 
0.16 
0.32 
t1=0.5t0 
t1=0.16t0/(0.16+t0) 
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concessions at that point. The exception of relatively high rates from the discipline of 
the formula approach contributed to the current problem of tariff peaks in the 
industrial countries. (See the peaks in Table 2).   
 
Hoekman and Olarreaga (2002) note that peak applied tariffs in the industrial 
countries are now around 50 times as high as the average rate. This contrasts with a 
ratio of five in the developing countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, six in Latin America, 
seven in the Middle East and North Africa, nine in South Asia, and 28 in East Asia. 
Clearly, the widespread use in developing country trade reforms of tops-down 
liberalization approaches noted by López and Panagariya (1992) has had a profound 
impact on the distribution of developing country tariffs. The combination of quite 
large differences in the means and the variances of tariffs across countries seems 
likely to create a need for a formula that could encompass the entire distribution of 
tariff rates without creating too much pressure for exceptions and special cases.   
 
One possible approach to dealing with this would involve application of a Swiss-type 
tariff reduction, guided by targeted reductions in the average tariff rather than a 
common Swiss formula parameter a.  In effect, this combines the targeting of the 
distribution of tariffs under the pure Swiss formula with the targeting of a reduction in 
the average tariff.  This targeted formula approach  takes care of the “one size fits all” 
problem of a common a parameter.  However, it still leaves the problem of flexibility. 
To combat the flexibility problem, one can generalize the Swiss formula to allow 
more flexibility in dealing with different tariff profiles. Under this flexible formula 
approach, the idea is to maintain the key attributes of the Swiss formula—its use of a 
uniform maximum below which all peak tariffs must be reduced and its progressive 
feature of cutting high tariffs by more than low tariffs—while allowing greater 
flexibility of approach to accommodate different preferences over tariff maxima and 
rates of reduction.  Might introducing additional flexibility result in a modified Swiss 
formula that would allow a compromise to be reached, while retaining the advantages 
of a formula approach? 
One way to provide some additional flexibility is to modify the original Swiss 
formula by introducing an additional parameter, b, into equation (5) to obtain: 
 
t1 = a ⋅ t0a ⋅ b + t0
= 1
a−1 + b ⋅ t0−1
 (5) 
 
We call parameter b a flexibility parameter as it allows the shape of the relationship 
between the initial and final tariffs to change3.    As can be seen from the second term 
in equation (5), the original Swiss formula is a special case of equation (5), with b= 1.  
As will become evident, the impact of tariff reductions on peak tariffs can be softened 
by adjustments to the a parameter, while compensating trading partners through 
reductions in lower tariffs sufficient to achieve a target reduction in the average. As b 
increases, the formula tends to increase the reduction in the lower tariffs, allowing for 
higher maximum rates with the same target reduction in the average tariff. Clearly, 
there is an entire family of Swiss formulas, which differ as a consequence of 
differences in the b values4. If we hold the reduction in the average tariff constant, 
                                                 
3 The first expression in (7) shows its similarity to the original Swiss formula. The second shows the 
source of the asymptotic feature of the equation—division by a rectangular hyperbola in the tariff rate.  
4 This formula has also been characterized as the Swiss-Army-knife approach to tariff reduction. 
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then as b rises from 1, the line showing the new tariff changes from the original Swiss 
formula curve in Figure 1 closer and closer to the linear reduction curve, providing 
potentially much greater flexibility to negotiators who had, hitherto, to choose one or 
the other approach.  
 
To avoid potential problems with formulas that increase the value of tariffs, the 
flexibility parameter, b, should be one or above.  This extended Swiss formula retains 
the key feature of the original Swiss formula that all tariffs are reduced below a 
ceiling given by a. Further, it retains the progressive reduction feature that higher 
tariffs are cut by more than lower tariffs. In this case, t1/t0 is given by: 
 
t1
t0
= a
a ⋅ b + t0
 (6) 
 
which confirms that reductions in higher tariffs will be larger than those on lower 
tariffs. 
 
If we start with a targeted reduction in the average tariff, then the extension of the 
Swiss formula in equation (5) widens the range over which a formula approach might 
potentially be used. For example, choice of a b value of 1.5, rather than 1.0 in 
equation (5), would reduce tariff rates below the maximum more rapidly than would 
have been the case with the original Swiss formula. Essentially, choosing a higher 
maximum while achieving the same percentage reduction in its average tariff would 
require a country to undertake bigger reductions in its relatively low tariff rates, while 
still preserving the progressive tendency of the Swiss formula to cut higher tariffs by 
at least the same proportion as lower rates. 
 
As will be developed below, the parameter a in any Swiss formula cant be chosen to 
yield a given ceiling tariff rate, or to achieve a given percentage cut in tariffs. Figure 2 
illustrates, for an example with tariffs ranging from 0% to 90%, the percentage 
reduction in each tariff rate necessary, given a target of a 50% reduction in the 
average tariff.  As shown, there is some scope for trading off cuts in higher tariffs 
with cuts in lower tariffs through adjustments to the compensation parameter.  The 
degree of actual flexibility depends on the underlying tariff schedule.  One critical 
point illustrated is that, in the extreme, all high-end tariffs must be reduced by at least 
the amount targeted for the average, implying that the limit of the flexibility allowed 
by the modified Swiss formula is a linear reduction formula.  5 
 
                                                 
5 Spreadsheets of the examples found in this paper are available from the authors upon request. 
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Figure 2. Flexibility and Swiss Formula-Based Tariff Reductions 
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There is a limit to the flexibility we can obtain using the compensation parameter. As 
we raise b, we are substituting larger cuts in smaller tariffs for smaller cuts in higher 
tariffs. Beyond some point, it becomes infeasible to meet the required reduction in 
average tariffs. Technically, when we apply equation (5), the parameter combination 
that allows for meeting the reduction in the average, with the smallest possible cuts in 
high tariffs, is the limiting value of b when a → ∞, given the constraint of a reduction 
in the average.  To find this value for any given targeted tariff cut, we can rearrange 
equation (5) as  
 
t1 − t0
t0
= 1
b + t0 ⋅ a−1
−1= m  (9) 
where m is the depth of cut, represented by a number such as –0.5 for a  50 percent 
cut in average tariffs, under the limiting case.  The limit of b, given the required 
proportional reduction in the average, m , will then be: 
 
lim
a → ∞ b  reduction  in  mean  =  m =
1
(1+ m )  
(10) 
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This implies that b=2 at the limit for a reduction in the average of m= -50%, and 
b=1.428 for m= -30%.   Given the constraints of the formula approach, if we do not 
reduce tariffs above the average by at least the target reduction in the average, we are 
otherwise unable to meet our target for the cut in the average.  In other words, 
adopting a combined targeted and flexible Swiss formula approach guarantees that 
peak rates will be cut by at least the cut in the average, even with flexibility. 
 
Of course, using the flexibility inherent in the flexible Swiss formula to move from 
the original Swiss formula outcome with the same average cut in tariffs has economic 
costs in economic efficiency and tariff revenues. Raising the tariffs on goods already 
subject to high tariffs reduces the volumes of these imports, which have the highest 
value in the domestic market relative to their cost on world markets. It also tends to 
reduce tariff revenues more for any given reduction in average tariffs, since the 
volumes of high-tariff imports decline relative to those of low-tariff imports. From the 
exporters’ point of view, it implies relatively small reductions in the imports with the 
greatest potential to grow as a result of liberalization. To the greatest extent possible, 
the use of this flexibility should therefore be avoided. However, some structured use 
of such flexibility may help counter political economy considerations that can drive a 
poorly-disciplined retreat to exceptions and other discretionary approaches.  
 
As we have seen, the flexibility in the use of a Swiss Formula approach can yield a 
number of alternatives, including the original Swiss Formula and a proportional cut in 
tariffs. It is also consistent with proposals to move to zero tariffs (see, for example, 
Preeg 2002)—that could be achieved by setting the a parameter to zero. A key issue is 
how it might be implemented given the market access landscape outlined above.  
 
5. SEMANTICS MATTER  
 
Many options for implementing formula approaches in a multilateral trade negotiation 
are possible, and we consider only a few new ones in this paper. However, we hope 
that the process of examining these options might help stimulate ideas on the wider 
range of possibilities. 
 
5.1 Average cuts or cuts in the average?  
  
One fundamental parameter in the negotiations is the objective of tariff reduction to 
be specified. Should it be specified in terms of a percentage reduction in average 
tariffs (simple or weighted); or in terms of an average tariff cut; or in terms of a 
ceiling tariff like the 0.15 used in the Swiss formula during the Tokyo Round; or as an 
average reduction in the price of imports6, or as a cut in tariffs weighted by the 
volume of imports?   
 
The difference between an average cut in tariffs and a cut in the average tariff seems 
small, but is actually fundamental. While the percentage reduction in the average  
tariff is an appealing organizing objective in that it is readily understood as measuring 
progress from the initial regime towards complete free trade, an average cut in tariffs 
seems to have the unfortunate political-economic effect of encouraging large 
                                                 
6 This measure, defined for a small country by ∆t/(1+t), where ∆t is the change in the tariff rate, is an 
important determinant of the increase in market access resulting from a negotiation.  
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percentage cuts in low tariff-rate commodities, as was evident in the Uruguay Round 
agreement on agriculture (Hathaway and Ingco 1996). Any approach with this feature 
may well reduce both tariff revenue and economic welfare. While other approaches 
have some merit, and measures such as the change in the price of imports should 
certainly be used in evaluating the consequences of any proposed formula, we focus 
initially on the familiar GATT negotiating objective of a percentage cut in the average 
tariff rate—a measure that has the intuitively-appealing feature of indicating the 
progress from the current situation to complete free trade7. 
 
If a reduction in the average (50 percent for our example) were set as a goal, the a 
parameter in the Swiss formula needed to bring this about would be determined by the  
initial distribution of tariffs in each country. During the Tokyo Round, evaluating the 
link between a given tariff reduction goal and the needed value of the a parameter 
would have been relatively difficult, and this may have contributed to the decision to 
set the a parameter rather than a goal in terms of a percentage cut in the average tariff. 
Now, finding the Swiss formula parameter that satisfies the requirement of a given 
reduction in average tariffs is easy for anyone with access to a spreadsheet program 
like Microsoft EXCEL and could potentially be automated for inclusion in trade and 
tariff analytical software like the WITS system8. Once a target reduction in the 
average tariff has been set, a program like EXCEL can be used to calculate the a 
parameter value that will achieve this goal with the basic Swiss formula.   
 
If countries were unable to accept the results from the initial application of the Swiss 
formula, they might be given the option of choosing a higher maximum and a 
different value of the b parameter to achieve the same reduction in average tariffs 
without such drastic reductions in peak tariffs. It is in this sense that the b parameter 
then serves as a compensation parameter, facilitating some maintenance of tariff 
peaks at the cost of deeper cuts on lower tariffs. Again, a simple program like 
Microsoft EXCEL’s Solver can be used to find the combinations of a and b consistent 
with the targeted reduction in average tariffs. 
 
As previously noted, the Swiss formula approach incorporates a tariff ceiling, but also 
provides a logical basis for making reductions in all tariffs below the ceiling without 
introducing discontinuities that are difficult to justify either analytically or to the 
special interests adversely affected by them. If the flexible Swiss formula approach 
were adopted, then either a tariff ceiling or a reduction in the average tariff could be 
chosen, but not both. If the ceiling rate is to be varied on the basis of special 
sensitivities in the tariff-peak sectors, then there seems a good case to require that a 
reduction in the average tariff be maintained even while the curvature of the Swiss 
formula is varied through changes in the b parameter. In fact, policy makers might 
wish to introduce a penalty, by requiring a higher average cut in tariffs, when use is 
made of greater flexibility. 
                                                 
7 Assuming all protection is provided through tariffs. 
8 The World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) system is being developed by the World Bank in 
conjunction with the TRAINS database of UNCTAD, and allows analysis using a range of databases, 
including the WTO’s Integrated Database (IDB) and Consolidated Tariff Schedules (CTS).    
Spreadsheet examples of the formula applications in this paper are available on request. 
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5.2 How to choose the base rate 
 
A key issue in implementing any formula-based approach is the base rate to which the 
formula should be applied. In a regional negotiation context, this rate will generally 
be the preferential applied rate. Countries using a formula approach to reform their 
own tariffs would generally use the applied MFN rate as the base.  Traditional GATT 
practice has been to focus on the bound rates contained in countries’ schedules of 
concession. This has the important advantage of creating no disincentive for 
undertaking unilateral reductions in applied rates of the type that have so sharply 
reduced protection in developing countries during the past 20 years (World Bank 
2001). In addition, this approach might be viewed as providing credit for unilateral 
liberalization in the sense that a prior unilateral reduction of applied rates reduces 
one-for-one the cut in applied rates required in a subsequent negotiation. Negotiations 
that focused on historical applied rates, say from the end of the Uruguay Round, 
would also have these two desirable  features.  
 
Clearly, the choice of current bound rates as the base would mean that some countries 
would have to make only small, or no, reductions in applied rates. Since WTO 
negotiations depend on meeting the needs of all participants, the approach to be 
adopted must meet the needs of participants. At the end of the day, countries will 
consider whether the reductions in their partners’ applied rates, and the increases in 
the security of their market access, resulting from the chosen base and reduction 
formula (or other approach) are sufficient to make the resulting package worthwhile.  
 
If the focus continues to be on bound, rather than applied, tariffs, then something will 
need to be done about the roughly 40 percent of tariffs on industrial products in 
developing countries that remain unbound.  (Again, see Table 1.)  One approach to 
dealing with this problem would be to agree on some basis for establishing tariff 
bindings on all of these products. The results of the Uruguay Round agreement on 
agriculture, where 100 percent binding was achieved by means that provided 
considerable discretion to individual countries suggests that some sort of formula 
approach might also be desirable in the tariff binding stage. Perhaps such bindings 
should be established at or below the average rate for tariff bindings on those sectors 
currently bound, or at a rate specified to be at, or a specific percentage above, current 
applied rates for the same commodity.  Additionally, binding overhang and unbound 
tariffs might also be addressed by use of recent historic average applied rates. 
 
 
5.3 Adding flexibility 
 
Even with the additional flexibility allowed by the extension of the Swiss formula 
offered in this paper, there is a risk that it would not be sufficiently general to meet 
the political constraints of all countries on all products. One way to deal with this 
problem would be to allow exceptions for particular, sensitive products. Based on 
GATT history, this approach seems likely to   undercut the whole objective of 
achieving substantial market access gains in the negotiations. In the Kennedy Round, 
the intent was to minimize exceptions (Baldwin 1986), but the discretion to make 
exceptions was initially given to individual countries. While the initial lists of 
exceptions in each country were relatively modest, each country had the right to pull 
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back from its original offers if it did not think a balance of concessions had been 
achieved. A spiraling process of withdrawals from the original offers substantially 
reduced the tariff cuts achieved.  In the Tokyo Round, a much larger number of 
exceptions was tabled from the beginning, and subsequent withdrawals to achieve a 
better perceived balance of concessions resulted in many products being excepted 
from the formula cuts.  
 
One way to deal with this problem of exceptions while allowing additional flexibility 
would be to make a formula cut first, and to allow for renegotiations with 
compensation from this new base. This approach shifts the onus in making exceptions 
from the country to its trading partners, and seems much less likely to lead to fewer 
and smaller exceptions than the traditional discretionary approaches. Clearly, it would 
ensure the maintenance of a balance of concessions—the lack of which created such 
difficulties in the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds. 
 
While we do not deal explicitly with the value of agricultural tariff-rate-quotas in this 
paper, reductions in out-of-quota tariffs may need to be associated with expansion of 
the quotas to help build support from the holders of the quotas. A simple rule might  
be to expand quotas by the same percent applied to the reduction in the average tariff 
binding.  This approach would help toreduce potential problems associated with 
reductions in the quota rents received by exporters holding Tariff-Rate-Quotas. 
 
Many other issues would need to be considered in a real-world negotiation. One 
potentially serious problem is created by specific, mixed and compound tariffs. Tops-
down formulas such as the Swiss formula cannot be directly applied to these tariffs, 
since it is not possible to know which are the high and low tariffs without knowledge 
of the value of the goods. One option would be to convert all specific tariffs to ad 
valorem form prior to applying the formula. Another would be to exclude them from 
application of the formula, and to use a straight percentage cut (linear) for all such 
tariffs.  
 
Whether the approaches outlined in this section and the previous section have any 
chance of being acceptable depends heavily on the nature of the distributions of 
applied tariffs and tariff bindings in member countries. Without knowledge of the 
distribution of tariffs, it is impossible to tell, for instance, whether specifying a target 
reduction in average tariffs will result in acceptable changes in peak tariff levels in 
particular countries or groups of countries. Similarly, it is impossible to know whether 
reductions based on choice of a tariff ceiling in a Swiss formula will produce 
reasonable reductions in average tariffs, or whether negotiations based on bindings 
would produce a coherent pattern of tariff reductions. The set of tables in the next 
section provides a very brief initial empirical evaluation of the implications of 
formula approaches for a range of countries, taking into account the current 
distribution of their tariffs and tariff bindings. 
 
 
6. AN EXAMPLE 
 
A simple, hypothetical analysis can illustrate some of the key implications of the 
approaches we discuss, including the implications of binding overhang. This is meant 
to be illustrative and, in particular, does not directly incorporate the requirement for 
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less than full reciprocity by developing countries in reduction commitments on non-
agricultural products specified in paragraph 16 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
(WTO 2001). The guidelines used for a notional market access package focused on a 
50 percent cut in average tariffs can be summarized as follows. 
 
• A target was set for a reduction in average tariff bindings of 50%.   
• Unbound tariffs were initially bound at 150% of applied MFN rates.  
• The parameter b was initially set to 1 (the original Swiss formula).   
• Agricultural and industrial tariffs were treated separately 
• Members could adjust the a and b parameters, as long as 
1. b remains at or above 1 
2. the average bound tariff falls by 50% or more 
3. other Members agree to the deviation from b=1 
• Any subsequent renegotiations of tariffs maintain the overall cut in the average 
tariff 
 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 present the effect of formula-based reductions on the tariff 
schedules of the EU, Japan, the United States (industrial countries) and Brazil, India, 
and Thailand (developing countries).  In all cases, the basic experiment is a targeted 
50% reduction in average bound tariffs9.  Table 2 summarizes results under the basic 
Swiss formula, while Tables 3 and 4 illustrate the effect of added flexibility through 
the flexibility parameter.  These are summarized in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 
 
 
For the United States, bound rates generally are very close to applied rates.  This is 
reflected in low initial binding overhang (the gap between average bound and applied 
rates shown as a percent of the average applied rate).  This also means that all 
variations in our formula lead to significant cuts, especially at the higher rates.  The 
                                                 
9 For reasons of data availability, only ad valorem  tariffs are considered. 
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result is a reduction in maximum rates, variance, and average rates.  Notice from 
Table 3 that peak rates are not reduced as much when the flexibility parameter b is 
raised above 1.  In particular, while still achieving a 50% reduction in the average 
bound rate, the United States would be able to keep its highest ad valorem applied 
rates on industrial goods in the range from 7.3 to 9.9 %, depending on the selection of 
the b parameter.  Similarly, the EU would be able to keep some peak industrial rates 
at up to four and a half times the average tariff.  Even though some notion of peak 
protection is preserved, peak rates themselves come down, the overall structure is 
flattened out under all approaches, and therefore tariff escalation is reduced. 
 
Brazil, by contrast, is a country with average bound rates well above applied rates.  
This is reflected in Table 2, as well as Table 4 and Figure 3.  From our analysis, we 
have found that a 35% target reduction in average bindings is just enough to reduce 
some of the peak rates, while leaving most applied rates untouched.  With a 50% 
reduction in average bindings, Brazil’s industrial average applied rate falls by 15.4%. 
While smaller than the proportional cut in average tariffs in the industrial countries, 
this translates into a larger percentage reduction in the cost of imports than those 
observed in the industrial countries. In agriculture, the binding overhang is so great 
that almost nothing happens to applied rates (a 50% reduction in bindings yields only 
a 3.7 percent reduction in applied rates.)  However, the binding overhang is reduced 
sufficiently to ensure real liberalization in subsequent negotiations.   We also need to 
recognize that bindings have value when they limit credible threats to raise tariffs.  
Based on the past 20 years, Brazil has had episodes of very high tariffs.  These new 
bound rates, being much closer to the applied rates than current bindings, therefore 
provide more market access security than current bindings.   
 
India realizes a similar (i.e. very small) cut in applied agricultural tariffs, again 
reflecting high binding overhang in both developed and developing countries.  The 
reduction in the average industrial tariffs is greater than in the case of Brazil. This 
reduction of 8 percentage points in the average tariff on industrial products implies a 
much larger reduction in the price of imports than in the case of the industrial 
countries. 
 
Thailand, with less binding overhang, realizes greater reductions in agricultural 
tariffs, with these tariffs reduced by over 40 percent relative to their initial average 
level.  In the industrial sector, Thailand’s reduction in applied rates is just over 30 
percent, which necessitates a reduction in applied tariffs of around 3 percentage 
points. This generates a reduction in the price of imports that is larger than in the 
industrial country cases considered.  
 
In agriculture, the problem of binding overhang is much more serious. Even with a 
large cut, such as the 50 percent cut in bindings considered here, we see only small 
reductions in applied rates on agricultural goods in Brazil and India. In Thailand, by 
contrast, we see sharp reductions in agricultural tariffs because of the limited binding 
overhang in this case. The problem is likely to be even more widespread than these 
initial results would indicate, because of the prevalence of specific tariffs and other 
non-ad valorem protection measures not included in the current data set. Even in the 
industrial countries, it seems likely that there would be problems associated with 
binding overhang in these commodities. The results indicate, however, that 
application of a formula approach would result in a significant reduction in binding 
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overhang, and at least some reduction in applied rates using an ambitious goal such as 
a fifty percent reduction in average tariffs. As shown by Francois and Martin 
(forthcoming), such reductions in binding overhang may have substantial value both 
to the importing country and to its trading partners.  
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we first consider the potential advantages of formula approaches in 
terms of their ability to generate large reductions in protection and to improve market 
access (not coincidentally making people better off as well). The fact that they can be 
used to achieve tops-down reductions in tariffs is seen as particularly important in 
achieving this objective. 
 
We then examine the key features of the market access landscape that will affect the 
choice of approaches to negotiations. These features include the large dispersion of 
average tariffs amongst the active participants in the negotiations, and the large gaps 
between applied and bound tariff rates in many countries and sectors. 
 
Our review of potential approaches to tariff reduction covers a range of formulas that 
has been proposed. The Swiss formula approach used in the Tokyo Round is seen as 
particularly desirable because of its ability to introduce a tariff rate ceiling, and to 
bring about larger reductions in the highest tariff rates. Unfortunately, it appears likely 
to be too restrictive to apply it with the same coefficient used in the Tokyo Round, 
particularly because of the large dispersion in the average and dispersion of  initial 
tariff rates, and the presence of binding overhang in many countries.   
 
To overcome, or at least reduce, this restrictiveness, we explore two new options for 
consideration, a targeted and a flexible Swiss formula approach. The first is a simple 
adaptation of the Swiss formula that is targeted to a specific reduction in average 
tariffs for particular country and commodity groups (eg agricultural and non-
agricultural) . The second is a more flexible version of the Swiss formula that would 
allow the same cut in the average tariff to be achieved with somewhat smaller 
reductions in peak tariffs.  Essentially, this increase in flexibility would allow larger 
cuts in smaller tariff rates to be used to compensate for smaller reductions in higher 
tariffs. While such a change would almost certainly reduce economic efficiency, it 
may ultimately be preferable to a retreat into exceptions as a way of reaching a 
politically-acceptable agreement. This flexible formula approach potentially allows 
for a Swiss family of formulas, or a Swiss-Army set of instruments, with different 
tradeoffs between tariff cuts on higher and lower tariff rates.  
 
We examine the potential outcomes of applying this family of formulas in three 
industrial country markets—Europe, Japan and the United States—and three 
developing country markets—Brazil, India and Thailand. In the example, we target 
cuts in average bound tariff rates in each country, considering agricultural and 
industrial products separately. Preliminary analysis suggests that, in this situation, 
only a bold cut, such as the 50 percent target used in the Kennedy Round, would make 
substantial progress in increasing market access in both developing and developed 
countries.  
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In industrial products, we find that a 50 percent cut in average tariff bindings would 
bring about substantial reductions in average applied rates in each country, while 
particularly reducing peak tariffs and escalation. While binding overhang reduces the 
percentage cuts in applied rates in the three developing countries, the resulting fall in 
the price of imports would still be larger in the three developing countries considered 
than in the industrial countries. 
 
In agricultural products, binding overhang is greater in many countries than it is for 
industrial products.  Based on the ad valorem tariff rate data used in this initial, 
exploratory analysis, even a 50 percent reduction in agricultural tariff bindings would 
produce only a very small reduction in applied tariff rates for India and Brazil. For the 
industrial countries, and for Thailand, substantial reductions in applied rates would be 
required. The results highlight the problems resulting created by the binding overhang 
from the Uruguay Round for obtaining a “balance of concessions” in the current 
negotiations on agricultural trade reform.  
 
Clearly, a great deal of work is likely before a way forward can be identified that is 
economically worthwhile, balanced, and politically acceptable. We hope that some of 
the ideas presented in this paper might prove useful in this difficult and demanding 
process.     
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 Table 1 
 
Industrial tariff rates and bindings -- post UR and ITA 
 Percent of MFN imports that are subject to: Tariff lines  
 bound tariffs unbound tariffs tariffs bound 
above applied 
rates 
tariffs unbound 
or bound above 
applied rates 
Share of bound 
duty free tariff 
lines to total 
tar. lines 
Total tariff 
lines 
Argentina 100.0 0.0 99.9 99.9 0.0 10530 
Australia 96.9 3.1 31.7 34.8 17.7 5520 
Brazil 100.0 0.0 91.0 91.0 0.5 10860 
Canada 99.8 0.2 45.7 45.9 34.5 6261 
Chile 100.0 0.0 99.7 99.7 0.0 5055 
Colombia 100.0 0.0 97.7 97.7 0.0 6145 
El Salvador 97.1 2.9 96.0 98.9 0.0 4922 
European Union 100.0 0.0 17.7 17.7 26.9 7635 
Hungary 93.6 6.4 3.3 9.7 10.4 5896 
India 69.3 30.7 14.8 45.5 0.0 4354 
Indonesia 92.3 7.7 86.6 94.3 0.0 7735 
Japan 95.9 4.1 0.1 4.2 47.4 7339 
Korea 89.8 10.2 3.4 13.6 11.6 8882 
Malaysia 79.3 20.7 31.0 51.7 1.6 10832 
Mexico 100.0 0.0 98.4 98.4 0.0 11255 
New Zealand 100.0 0.0 46.5 46.5 39.5 5894 
Norway 100.0 0.0 36.5 36.5 46.6 5326 
Peru 100.0 0.0 98.5 98.5 0.0 4545 
Phillipines 67.4 32.6 15.5 48.1 0.0 5387 
Poland 92.8 7.2 44.6 51.8 2.2 4354 
Singapore 36.5 63.5 11.7 75.2 15.2 4963 
Sri Lanka 9.2 90.8 1.4 92.2 0.1 5933 
Thailand 67.4 32.6 8.9 41.5 0.0 5244 
Tunisia 67.9 32.1 41.5 73.6 0.0 5087 
Turkey 49.3 50.7 0.0 50.7 1.4 15479 
United States 100.0 0.0 14.0 14.0 39.4 7872 
Uruguay 100.0 0.0 96.3 96.3 0.0 10530 
Venezuela 100.0 0.0 90.3 90.3 0.0 5974 
Zimbabwe 13.6 86.4 3.9 90.3 3.0 1929 
       
source: Francois (2001), based on WTO and World Bank data on Uruguay Round and post-Information Technology 
Agreement schedules. 
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Table 2 
Summary of Effects of Basic Swiss Formula Reductions 
Applied tariffs before and after a 50% cut in average tariff bindings 
  Agriculture                 
post-UR and ITA tariffs   effect of basic formula application on tariffs     
simple 
average 
standard 
deviation 
maximum 
tariff 
binding 
overhang 
simple 
average 
standard 
deviation 
maximum 
tariff 
binding 
overhang 
Percent 
reduction in 
average 
European 
Union 
5.9 7.5 74.9 0.3 3.0 2.9 10.9 0.1 -48.6 
Japan 6.2 8.1 43.3 1.2 3.5 3.7 13.9 0.2 -43.0 
United 
States 
3.5 7.4 90.0 0.5 1.9 2.4 11.5 0.1 -46.6 
                    
Brazil 12.9 5.1 27.0 22.6 12.4 4.6 22.3 5.3 -3.7 
India 31.0 20.8 150.0 90.7 29.5 14.9 70.8 31.3 -4.8 
Thailand 26.5 14.4 65.0 7.1 15.1 6.3 30.1 1.7 -43.0 
  Non-agriculture              
post-UR and ITA tariffs   effect of basic formula application on tariffs     
simple 
average 
standard 
deviation 
maximum 
tariff 
binding 
overhang 
simple 
average 
standard 
deviation 
maximum 
tariff 
binding 
overhang 
Percent 
reduction in 
average 
European 
Union 
3.7 3.6 17.0 0.4 1.9 1.4 5.0 0.1 -47.7 
Japan 2.3 3.4 30.9 0.1 1.2 1.4 5.6 0.0 -48.5 
United 
States 
3.2 4.3 37.5 0.2 1.7 1.6 6.1 0.0 -48.3 
                    
Brazil 15.9 6.0 35.0 14.9 13.5 4.2 16.7 1.9 -15.4 
India 19.2 16.5 40.0 3.9 11.3 9.2 30.5 0.3 -41.3 
Thailand 10.5 10.8 80.0 7.8 7.2 6.1 20.7 2.0 -31.6 
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Table 3 
EU, Japan, and US: Effects of a 50% Reduction in Average Bound Rates 
EUROPEAN UNION            
  ”a” parameter compen-sation 
(b) parameter 
simple average 
tariff (percent) 
standard error maximum 
tariff (percent) 
simple average 
binding 
overhang  
(pct points) 
Percent 
reduction in 
average tariff 
*Ag 1 0 5.9 7.5 74.9 0.3 N/A 
*Non-Ag 1 0 3.7 3.6 17.0 0.4 N/A 
                
Ag 12.7 1.0 3.0 2.9 10.9 0.1 -48.6 
Non-Ag 6.4 1.0 1.9 1.4 5.0 0.1 -47.7 
                
Ag 16.5 1.2 3.0 3.0 13.0 0.1 -48.5 
Non-Ag 8.2 1.2 1.9 1.5 5.7 0.1 -47.6 
                
Ag 27.9 1.5 3.0 3.2 17.9 0.1 -48.4 
Non-Ag 13.7 1.5 1.9 1.6 7.1 0.1 -47.5 
                
Percent of industrial tariff lines currently unbound: 0%     
          
*note:  a:1, b:0 corresponds to zero cuts.  The first two rows therefore represent post- 
Uruguay Round (or base) rates of tariffs.      
Also, agriculture tariffs are limited to ad valorem tariffs.  Other specific tariffs may be 
applied to excluded tariff lines, typically at higher ad valorem rates than averages shown. 
 
JAPAN              
  ”a” parameter compen-sation 
(b) parameter 
simple average 
tariff (percent) 
standard error maximum 
tariff (percent) 
simple average 
binding 
overhang (pct 
points) 
Percent 
reduction in 
average tariff 
*Ag 1 0 6.2 8.1 43.3 1.2 N/A 
*Non-Ag 1 0 2.3 3.4 30.9 0.1 N/A 
                
Ag 17.1 1.0 3.5 3.7 13.9 0.2 -43.0 
Non-Ag 6.3 1.0 1.2 1.4 5.6 0.0 -48.5 
                
Ag 22.7 1.2 3.5 3.9 16.6 0.2 -43.2 
Non-Ag 8.1 1.2 1.2 1.5 6.8 0.0 -48.4 
                
Ag 39.6 1.5 3.5 4.2 21.3 0.2 -43.7 
Non-Ag 13.9 1.5 1.2 1.6 9.7 0.0 -48.4 
         
Percent of industrial tariff lines currently unbound: 0.84%    
         
*note:  a:1, b:0 corresponds to zero cuts.  The first two rows therefore represent post- 
Uruguay Round (or base) rates of tariffs.     
Also, agriculture tariffs are limited to ad valorem tariffs.  Other specific tariffs may be 
applied to excluded tariff lines, typically at higher ad valorem rates than averages shown. 
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Table 3 – continued 
UNITED STATES            
  ”a” parameter compen-sation 
(b) parameter 
simple average 
tariff (percent) 
standard error maximum 
tariff (percent) 
simple average 
binding 
overhang (pct 
points) 
Percent 
reduction in 
average tariff 
*Ag 1 0 3.5 7.4 90.0 0.5 N/A 
*Non-Ag 1 0 3.2 4.3 37.5 0.2 N/A 
                
Ag 12.4 1.0 1.9 2.4 11.5 0.1 -46.6 
Non-Ag 7.2 1.0 1.7 1.6 6.1 0.0 -48.3 
                
Ag 17.4 1.2 1.9 2.6 15.3 0.1 -46.2 
Non-Ag 9.5 1.2 1.7 1.7 7.3 0.0 -48.2 
                
Ag 34.7 1.5 1.9 3.0 26.0 0.1 -45.9 
Non-Ag 16.2 1.5 1.7 1.9 9.9 0.0 -48.1 
          
Percent of industrial tariff lines currently unbound: 0%    
         
*note:  a:1, b:0 corresponds to zero cuts.  The first two rows therefore represent post- 
Uruguay Round (or base) rates of tariffs.     
Also, agriculture tariffs are limited to ad valorem tariffs.  Other specific tariffs may be 
applied to excluded tariff lines, typically at higher ad valorem rates than averages shown. 
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Table 4 
Brazil, India, Thailand: Effects of a 50% Reduction in Average Bound Rates 
BRAZIL              
  ”a” parameter compen-sation 
(b) parameter 
simple average 
tariff (percent) 
standard error maximum 
tariff (percent) 
simple average 
binding 
overhang (pct 
points) 
Percent 
reduction in 
average tariff 
*Ag 1 0 12.9 5.1 27.0 22.6 N/A 
*Non-Ag 1 0 15.9 6.0 35.0 14.9 N/A 
                
Ag 37.4 1 12.4 4.6 22.3 5.3 -3.7 
Non-Ag 31.8 1 13.5 4.2 16.7 1.9 -15.4 
                
Ag 47.0 1.2 12.4 4.6 23.2 5.3 -4.0 
Non-Ag 39.8 1.2 13.5 4.3 16.8 1.9 -15.3 
                
Ag 75.8 1.5 12.3 4.6 24.7 5.4 -4.5 
Non-Ag 64.3 1.5 13.5 4.4 17.1 1.9 -15.1 
         
Percent of industrial tariff lines currently unbound: 0%    
         
*note:  a:1, b:0 corresponds to zero cuts.  The first two rows therefore represent post- 
Uruguay Round (or base) rates of tariffs.     
Also, agriculture tariffs are limited to ad valorem tariffs.  Other specific tariffs may be 
applied to excluded tariff lines, typically at higher ad valorem rates than averages shown. 
 
INDIA               
  ”a” parameter compen-sation 
(b) parameter 
simple average 
tariff (percent) 
standard error maximum 
tariff (percent) 
simple average 
binding 
overhang (pct 
points) 
Percent 
reduction in 
average tariff 
*Ag 1 0 31.0 20.8 150.0 90.7 N/A 
*Non-Ag 1 0 19.2 16.5 40.0 3.9 N/A 
                
Ag 134.2 1 29.5 14.9 70.8 31.3 -4.8 
Non-Ag 38.3 1 11.3 9.2 30.5 0.3 -41.3 
                
Ag 169.9 1.2 29.5 15.0 72.0 31.4 -4.9 
Non-Ag 48.1 1.2 11.3 9.3 34.7 0.3 -41.3 
                
Ag 277.2 1.5 29.4 15.1 73.5 31.4 -5.0 
Non-Ag 77.6 1.5 11.2 9.3 35.0 0.3 -41.3 
          
Percent of industrial tariff lines currently unbound: 38%     
          
*note:  a:1, b:0 corresponds to zero cuts.  The first two rows therefore represent post- 
Uruguay Round (or base) rates of tariffs.      
Also, agriculture tariffs are limited to ad valorem tariffs.  Other specific tariffs may be 
applied to excluded tariff lines, typically at higher ad valorem rates than averages shown. 
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Table 4 -- continued 
 
THAILAND           
  ”a” parameter compen-sation 
(b) parameter 
simple average 
tariff (percent) 
standard error maximum 
tariff (percent) 
simple average 
binding 
overhang (pct 
points) 
Percent 
reduction in 
average tariff 
*Ag 1 0 26.5 14.4 65.0 7.1 N/A 
*Non-Ag 1 0 10.5 10.8 80.0 7.8 N/A 
          
Ag 38.2 1.0 15.1 6.3 30.1 1.7 -43.0 
Non-Ag 27.8 1.0 7.2 6.1 20.7 2.0 -31.6 
          
Ag 48.9 1.2 15.1 6.6 34.6 1.7 -42.9 
Non-Ag 35.0 1.2 7.2 6.1 23.0 2.0 -31.4 
          
Ag 81.5 1.5 15.1 7.2 43.8 1.7 -42.9 
Non-Ag 56.5 1.5 7.2 6.2 27.4 1.9 -31.1 
          
Percent of industrial tariff lines currently unbound: 32%   
         
*note:  a:1, b:0 corresponds to zero cuts.  The first two rows therefore represent post- 
Uruguay Round (or base) rates of tariffs.      
Also, agriculture tariffs are limited to ad valorem tariffs.  Other specific tariffs may be 
applied to excluded tariff lines, typically at higher ad valorem rates than averages 
shown. 
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Appendix 
 
Impacts of Different Formulas on the Price of Imports 
 
The change in the price of imports for any given tariff change depends on the change 
in the power of the tariff T=t/(1+t). In a small country, the change in T exactly 
determines the price impact while, in a large country, it is also influenced by the 
impact of the tariff change on world prices. Whether a formula results in rising or 
falling proportional reductions in the domestic prices of imported goods is determined 
by the derivative of T with respect to t0 . 
 
Proportional Cuts 
 
For the proportional cut formula, it may be useful todefine the market access 
concession µ as follows: 
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(A.1) 
 
The derivative makes clear that the proportional price reduction increases with the 
initial tariff level using the proportional cut approach.  
 
Linear Reduction Formula 
 
This approach has the desirable feature that the percentage cuts in tariffs increase with 
the intial tariff rate. As can be send from equation A.2, the ratio t1/t0   falls as t0  rises, 
implying larger percentage tariff cuts as the initial tariff level rises. 
 
 
t1
t0
= d
t0
+ f  (A.2) 
 
 
We can estimate the impact on domestic prices in a similar manner to that done for 
the proportional cut approach above: 
 
µ = −∆t
1+ t0
= − d + f −1( )t0
1+ t0
= −d
1+ t0
+ −( f −1)
t0
−1 +1
dµ
dt0
= d
1+ t0( )2 −
( f −1)
t0
−1 +1( )2 t0
−2 > 0
 
(A.3) 
 
Swiss Formula 
 
The progressive nature of the reductions under the Swiss formula can be shown by the 
ratio of the new to the old tariff: 
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t1
t0
= a
a + t0
 (A.4) 
  
If we examine equation (6) it is clear that, as t0  increases, the ratio t1/t0 declines, 
implying that the higher initial tariff rates are subject to larger percentage reductions. 
Like the other approaches discussed above, the Swiss-formula also yields market 
access concessions that are greater for high tariff products than low-tariff products.  
Formally, we have: 
 
µ = −∆t
1+ t0
= −
at0
a + t0
− t0
1+ t0
= −t0 a1+ t0( ) a + t0( ) −
1
1+ t0
 
  
 
  
dµ
dt0
= t0 2a + at0 + t0( )
a + t0( )2 1+ t0( )2 > 0
 
(A.4) 
 
